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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 Let a modal truth be any truth that is about modal entities, such as 
essences, abilities, or dispositional properties, or that contains modal 
expressions such as: possibly, necessarily, may, must, could, would, can, and so 
on. Examples of modal truths include: It is impossible that I jump to the moon; 
Necessarily, God exists; Lea has the ability to brighten one’s day; Were I hungrier, 
I would make more noodles.  
 That there are modal truths is largely uncontroversial. What feature of 
reality grounds the truth of modal propositions, what makes them true, is 
considerably controversial, however. Modal dispositionalism is a theory about 
what makes at least some modal propositions true. It maintains that irreducibly 
modal dispositions are what make (at least some) modal propositions true.
 In my thesis, I more fully develop modal dispositionalism and so show it 
to be a potentially viable theory of modality. In particular, I improve on already 
extant formulations of the theory, position it as a Neo-Aristotelian view with 
advantages over its close contemporary cousins, and make explicit certain of its 
ontologically heavy consequences.  
 If successful, my discussion demonstrates that modal dispositionalism is 
a realist, actualist, non-reductive account of modality. Additionally, it is shown 
that a basic formulation of modal dispositionalism, MD, is committed to the 
existence of either an actual infinity of contingent beings or to at least one 
necessary being. A reformulation of MD is shown to avoid commitment to an 
actual infinity of contingent beings and to validate two necessary axioms for S5. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In everyday discourse, we speak of possibilities, potentialities, 
dispositions, etc. For example, consider the following, ordinary claims: I could 
eat a peanut-butter sandwich for breakfast, rather than an omelet. My coffee cup 
could potentially chip, should I drop it. My phone is disposed to connect 
automatically to my wireless network. I can prevent my phone from so doing. 
My bookshelf can hold more than 50 pounds without breaking. Now, consider 
the following, respective paraphrases of these claims: There is the possibility that 
I eat a peanut-butter sandwich for breakfast, rather than an omelet. My coffee 
cup has the potential to chip, should I drop it. My phone has the disposition to 
connect automatically to my wireless network. I have the ability to prevent my 
phone from so doing. My bookshelf has the capacity to hold more than 50 pounds 
without breaking. Although these paraphrases are perhaps somewhat more 
stilted than their counterparts, the English language nonetheless permits their 
formation. 
All of these sentences are modal truths, insofar as they refer to 
possibilities, dispositions, capacities, etc. More generally, the broad category of 
modality includes: necessities, possibilities, counterfactuals, dispositional 
properties, powers, essences, and “anything that is expressed by modal 
expressions in the linguist’s sense: can, must, may, would and so on.”1 That they 
are true is largely uncontroversial.2 Indeed, that there are many modal 
                                                 
1 Barbara Vettter, “Recent Work: Modality Without Possible Worlds,” Analysis Reviews 71, no. 4 
(2011): 743. 
2My apparent ascription of truth to sentences should not be taken as an endorsement of the view 
that sentences are bearers of truth (which would indeed be controversial). Here, I use “sentence” 
(alt. “statement”) and “proposition” synonymously for considerations of brevity. Such apparent 
ascriptions of truth to sentences can be freely reformulated to apparently ascribe truth to 
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statements that are true is widely accepted. However, that which grounds the 
truth of a modal statements (if a ground is even needed), what portion of reality 
makes a modal truth true, is a matter of considerable controversy. To introduce a 
contemporary term of art, the relevant question that various modal theorists 
seek to answer is, “What are the truthmakers of modal statements?” Minimally 
stated, truthmakers are those things which make some truth true. It is an open 
question whether or not all truths have a truthmaker, but that some do is 
relatively uncontroversial. The proposition <There exists a glacier in Glacier Bay 
National Park> is presumably made true by the glacier, a concrete object, which 
is in Glacier Bay National Park. Alternatively, some have held that truthmakers 
are states-of-affairs, and so the truthmaker of the above statement is the state-of-
affairs a glacier existing in Glacier Bay National Park, of which the glacier is a part.3  
In part, modal dispositionalism is a theory about what sort of entity plays 
the role of truthmaker for modal statements. Insofar as it holds that there are 
truthmakers for at least some modal statements, it maintains there are at least 
some modal truths and so is a realism about modal truths. Dispositionalists 
contend that the truthmakers for modal truths are dispositions of concrete 
objects. These dispositions are grounded by irreducibly modal, dispositional 
properties or complexes thereof (or, in some cases, just are the dispositional 
properties.4). Perhaps unsurprisingly, these dispositional properties or property 
complexes are had by the concrete object to which the disposition belongs. 
                                                                                                                                                
propositions. E.g. “All of the propositions expressed by these sentences are modal truths.” 
3That is, the concrete object, the glacier, is a part of the state-of-affairs if states-of-affairs are 
concrete. 
4 Eg., in the case of quantum particles. Presumably, one may hold that all dispositions are 
identical to one or more dispositional properties. This conclusion may be reached because of 
mereological commitments or consideration of theoretical qualitative parsimony, for example.  
3 
 
Further, the dispositional properties cause the manifestation of the disposition.  
In my thesis, I more fully develop modal dispositionalism and so show it 
to be a viable theory of modality. In particular, I improve on already extant 
formulations of the theory, position it as a Neo-Aristotelian view with 
advantages over its close contemporary cousins, and make explicit certain of its 
ontologically heavy consequences.  
In section 2, I present preliminary remarks on the nature of my thesis, 
namely, the development of a theory of truthmakers for modal truths. An initial 
formulation of modal dispositionalism is given. This formulation is as follows: 
(MD): State-of-affairs S is possible iff there is at least one actual 
disposition d, the manifestation of which is (or includes) S,  
To round off the survey, I go on to present oft-touted advantages of modal 
dispositionalism over two popular competing, modal truthmaker theories, 
Robert Adams’s actualist ersatzism and David Lewis’s nonactualist concretism. I 
also discuss the features of modal dispositionalism that are attractive to its 
adherents. Section 2, then, is primarily a clarification of the sort of theory that 
modal dispositionalism is intended to be, as well as a statement of 
presuppositions that significantly shape the thesis.  
Having laid the necessary foundation, I go on in section 3 to discuss 
Aristotle’s theory of modality as found in the Metaphysics. Discussion is 
supplemented by examination of Aristotle’s theory of change in the Physics. 
Aristotle’s theory is very much a historical predecessor of modal 
dispositionalism and my discussion makes plain some of the central mutual 
commitments. Aristotle’s view and modal dispositionalism are both realisms 
about modality as well as forms of actualism, where actualism is the thesis that 
4 
 
all that is, exists, or is actual. Moreover, both theories affirm a biconditional 
relationship between possibility and causal capabilities (broadly construed).  
Also in section 3, I expound more fully on modal dispositionalism by 
discussing the nature of dispositions. I consider paradigms of dispositions such 
as fragility and present how the modal dispositionalist takes the truth of 
necessities and possibilities to be grounded. In so doing, I make clear that modal 
dispositionalism is in fact a form of realism about modality, a form of actualism, 
and a theory that grounds modal truths in causally efficacious entities.  
Having more thoroughly examined modal dispositionalism, I proceed to 
refine it in section 4. In particular, I argue that a common formulation of 
principle MD needs to be modified for two reasons: (1) The formulation requires 
an infinite number of contingent beings, and this seems like an unduly heavy, 
ontological commitment of the theory. (2) It does not validate axiom T or K, 
which are needed for S5. I suggest a revision of MD according to which 
existence is a necessary and sufficient condition for possibility. This 
reformulation is as follows: 
 (MD*) State-of-affairs S is possible iff either S is actual, or there is at least 
one actual disposition d, the manifestation of which is (or includes) 
S.  
I formalize MD*, define necessity, and show that MD* validates K and T. I 
finish section 4 by presenting an argument that draws support from MD and 
MD* and whose conclusion is that there is at least one necessary being. I take 
this to be a metaphysically heavy claim and so one relevant to weighing the 
merits of modal dispositionalism.  
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2. ENTER MODAL DISPOSITIONALISM 
 
2.1 Dispositions and an Initial Formulation of Modal Dispositionalism 
It is not clear that all dispositionalists admit dispositions into their 
ontology as distinct from dispositional properties. At times, it seems as if 
mention of dispositions is merely a heuristic device, analogous to the frequent 
use of “possible worlds” by philosophers who clearly do not endorse an 
ontology that includes maximally consistent sets of states-of-affairs, 
propositions, or concrete worlds other than our own. For instance, Contessa 
(2010), though himself not a dispositionalists, makes no mention of dispositions 
when he says, “Dispositionalists roughly maintain that, if some object has a 
dispositional property or a power whose manifestation includes p, then it is 
possible that p.”5 Barbara Vetter, a prominent dispositionalist, speaking of those 
who share her view, states, “But at bottom, their metaphysics is not going to 
contain possible worlds or irreducible necessities. It contains, rather, irreducible 
dispositions.”6 But she goes on to say in a footnote that  
“[t]he claim is not that every disposition is irreducible. A glass’s fragility, 
for instance, can presumably be reduced to properties of the glass’s 
constituents and relations between them.”7  
 Again, making no mention of dispositions, dispositionalist Chad Vance 
describes the theory thus: “for any unactualized metaphysical possibility, S, S is 
possible (ultimately) in virtue of some actual dispositional property of some 
                                                 
5 Gabriele Contessa, “Modal Truthmakrs and Two Varieties of Actualism,” Synthese 174 (2010): 
342. 
6 Barbara Vettter, “’Can’ Without Possible Worlds: Semantics for Anti-Humeans,” Philosophers 
Imprint 13, no. 16 (2013): 2. 
7 Ibid. 
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actual object.”8 Regardless of whether dispositions are a distinct ontological 
category or a convenient fiction, dispositionalists unanimously claim that modal 
truths are ultimately grounded in irreducibly modal, dispositional entities, 
whether tropes, universals, substances, etc. As this is the case, dispositionalism 
is also a realism about modality simpliciter. That is, it does not attempt to reduce 
the modal to the nonmodal. I formulate modal dispositionalism as follows: 
(MD) State-of-affairs S is possible iff there is at least one actual disposition d, 
the manifestation of which is (or includes) S.9 
As an illustration of the above account, consider the true modal 
proposition <I could have eaten a peanut-butter sandwich for breakfast>. The 
contention is that there is a possible state-of-affairs, my eating a peanut-butter 
sandwich.10 On dispositionalism, what makes this state-of-affairs possible is my 
ability to bring it about. Or more accurately, it is my disposition11 that is 
ontologically supported by one or more of my dispositional properties, which 
could manifest as my bringing it about. On dispositionalism, then, something is 
metaphysically possible iff it could be causally brought into existence. This point 
is crucial to discussion in section 4, where I argue that dispositionalists are 
committed to a heavy metaphysical thesis. 
                                                 
8 Chad Vance, “In Defense of the New Actualism: Dispositional Modal Truthmakers and the 
Branching Conception of Possibility,” (PhD thesis, University of Colorado, 2013), 106. 
9 This is a modified version of Borghini and Williams (2008). I have added the qualifier, “at least 
one,” in order to allow for overdetermination of modal truths, as modal dispositionalists, 
including Borghini and Williams themselves, do not seem to rule it out in principle. Andrea 
Borghini and Neil E Williams, “A Dispositionalist Theory of Possibility,” Dialectica 62, no. 1 
(2008): 26. 
10 Whether the modal dispositionalist must include states-of-affairs in her ontology is taken up in 
the following section. 
11 In the remainder of this thesis, I largely adopt the dispositionalist convention of using the term 
“disposition.” Although, as noted above, it is at times unclear whether dispositionalists believe 
the term takes a referent. 
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2.2 Competing Views and Modal Dispositionalism’s Attraction 
Of course, dispositionalism is but one account of modal truthmakers. In 
recent decades, two competing, modal truthmaker theories have enjoyed 
predominance. They are what I will call actualist ersatzism and non-actualist 
concretism. Like dispositionalism, both views are realisms about modal truths in 
that they maintain that modal truths have truthmakers. A prominent defender of 
actualist ersatzism is Robert Adams, who roughly maintains that modal 
propositions are made true by certain sets of propositions.12 Adams defines a 
“world-story” as a consistent set of propositions that is total in that it contains, 
for every proposition p, either p or its negation. He further defines the “actual 
world” as the world-story that contains all and only true propositions and calls 
it the “true story.”13 According to Adams, the proposition <The election debate 
could have had genuine rules> is true because the proposition <The election 
debate has genuine rules> is true in at least one world-story. The account is 
actualist about modal truthmakers, in that it maintains they are actual, and so is 
like dispositionalism in this respect.  
Non-actualist concretism is maintained by David Lewis, who suggests 
that modal truths are made true by concrete entities outside of the actual world. 
By stipulation, to be a concretist about modal truthmakers is to hold that modal 
truths are made true by concrete entities.14 According to Lewis, the proposition 
<I have the ability to become a pineapple famer> is true because at least one of 
                                                 
12 That Adams account is a truthmaker theory about modal propositions is not entirely clear. 
13 Robert Adams, “Theories of Actuality,” Noûs, 8 (1974). 
14 Though, presumably, not always essentially concrete entities. See Bernard Linsky and Edward 
N. Zalta, “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic,” Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 
431-458. or Timothy Williamson, “The Necessary Framework of Objects,” Topoi 19 (2000): 201-
208. 
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my counterparts, a concrete individual relevantly similar to myself, is a 
pineapple farmer in some concrete world other than my own. Dispositionalism 
is only loosely like Lewis’s view, because it grounds the truth of modal 
propositions in dispositions or properties that are ontologically dependent on 
concretia that bear them.  
Given the successes of these competing views, what are the merits of 
dispositionalism that lead some to prefer it? When surveying recent 
dispositionalist literature, one finds two common answers that can be succinctly 
stated: (1) On dispositionalism, modal truths are not simply accidents as they 
are on the other two views. (2) Dispositionalism is quantitatively and 
qualitatively more parsimonious. 
Regarding (1), dispositionalists object that its competitors make all modal 
truths into mere accidents by grounding them in entities entirely extrinsic to the 
concrete, actual world. On Adams’s view, for example, <Possibly, I eat a peanut-
butter sandwich for breakfast> is true if and only if one of the possible worlds 
contains a proposition representing me as eating a peanut-butter sandwich. 
<Necessarily, Joe Hisaishi15 is a person> is true just in case he is represented as 
being such in all possible worlds. The problem is that this de re truth is in no way 
grounded by Joe Hisaishi or his essence (if there are such things), but rather by 
representational entities. This seems flatly wrong. The problem becomes more 
pronounced when one considers that propositions are generally taken to be 
causally impotent. Lewis’s counterpart theory fares no better, as the truthmakers 
of modal truths are about as extrinsic as they come, found in worlds that are 
both causally and spatiotemporally isolated from one another.  Dispositionalism, 
                                                 
15 Note, Joe Hisaishi is an actual person. He is also a great composer. 
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in contrast, grounds modal truths in actual, causally efficacious entities. Hence, 
we find Barbara Vetter saying, “I believe that this, the actual world abounds . . . 
in modal properties possessed by individual objects. I have no need to outsource 
modality to other possible worlds.”16 
Contention (2) is straightforward enough. Adams’s view posits entities of 
a very different sort, i.e. maximally consistent sets of propositions, in order to 
ground modal truths. Lewis’s view introduces a very large number of concrete 
worlds and he says as much, “My realism about possible worlds is merely 
quantitatively, not qualitatively, unparsimonious.”17 In contrast, modal 
dispositionalism is often taken by its proponents as a helpful offshoot of their 
dispositionalism simpliciter, which already includes all the entities needed to do 
the work of modal truthmakers. 18 As dispositionalists see it, truthmaking 
requires causal potency, an already familiar and arguably primitive notion, and 
dispositionalism simpliciter supplies causally potent entities. Hence, Borghini 
and Williams write, “as far as we are concerned, dispositions are something we 
need in our ontology anyway, and we are not alone. A well-rounded account of 
worldly phenomena that does not include dispositions (or disposition-like 
entities) is bound to fail. And if that is the case, why bother going outside that 
framework to deal with possibility, if the dispositions can deal with it 
                                                 
16 Barbara Vettter, “’Can’ Without Possible Worlds,” 2. 
17 David Lewis, Counterfactuals, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1973), 87. 
18 Here, I use “dispositionalism simplicter” synonymously with what the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy calls “dispositional monism” or “causal theory of properties.” I take it to be the 
view that, “the essence of a property P is wholly constituted by the nomic or causal 
roles P plays—for short, theoretical roles.” Sungho Choi and Michael Fara. “Dispositions,” 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/. 
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themselves?”19 
As we have seen, dispositionalism is an actualism about modal 
truthmakers. Furthermore, it specifies modal truthmakers as causal entities, 
dispositions that are either grounded by or identical with dispositional (causal) 
properties. Dispositionalists take these features to give their theory an edge over 
its competitors for the reasons listed above, typically with special deference to 
the theory’s ontological parsimony in both quantity and kind of constituents.  
Whatever one’s final assay of the theory, however, I argue that it is 
precisely the dispositionalist’s actualism and view towards grounding 
metaphysical possibility in causal entities that commits her to the ontologically 
heavy thesis found in section 4, MHC. Before arguing for this latter point, 
however, I first expound upon MD and argue that its common origin with 
powers theories of modality is found in the thought of Aristotle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Borghini and Williams, “A Dispositionalist Theory . . . ,” 33. 
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3. MODAL DISPOSITIONALISM AS NEO-ARISTOTELIAN THEORY OF 
MODALITY 
 In this section, I argue that modal dispositionalism is a neo-Aristotelian 
theory of modality insofar as it shares the following features with Aristotle’s 
theory of modality (henceforth, AM) that is developed primarily in Metaphysics 
IX. Both MD and AM are (1) truthmaker theories about modal propositions that 
(2) define necessity in terms of possibility, and (3) posit irreducibly modal, 
disposition-like entities as truthmakers.20  
 This section is intended to contribute to the better understanding of 
modal dispositionalism both through direct examination and by providing close 
comparison with the thought of Aristotle, in which it finds its philosophic 
heritage. As features (1)-(3) are central to both MD and AM, I take it that 
exacting discussion of these features will better illumine exactly where MD and 
AM overlap, as well as provide a better understanding of each theory as distinct 
theory. An additional upshot of this comparison is that modal dispositionalism’s 
relation to powers theories of modality, a genus of which modal 
dispositionalism is a species, should likewise be made clearer.    
 In section 3.1, I very briefly discuss modal dispositionalism’s place among 
its contemporary cousins. In section 3.2.1, I demonstrate exactly how MD has 
features (1) and (2). This section is very much an expansion of the groundwork 
laid in section 2.  In section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, I argue that Aristotle endorses a 
biconditional relationship between possibility and potencies that is very similar 
                                                 
20 From (1) and (2), it follows that both MD and AM are also (4) forms of actualism, (again, the 
thesis that everything that is, exists, or is actual) and (5) non-reductive accounts of modality. 
These latter points come for free, so to speak, once the former points are established and so are 
not extensively elaborated upon.  
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to MD. This biconditional (AM) also possesses features (1) and (2). In section 
3.3.1 - 3.3.3, I examine the nature of dispositional properties,21 entities central to 
MD. I conclude that they are multi-track and irreducibly modal in nature, and so 
have feature (3). In section 3.3.4, I argue that Aristotle conceives of potencies 
(dunameis) as multi-track and irreducibly modal in nature, and so as having 
feature (3). I conclude that MD is a neo-Aristotelian theory of modality.  
 
3.1 An Absence of Aristotle in Neo-Aristotelian Theories of Modality 
 In the past decade, a number of philosopher’s have put forward theories 
of modality that appeal either to powers, potentialities, causal capabilities, or 
dispositions to define the possibility operator. These philosopher’s take these 
entities to be irreducibly modal in nature. Let the class of entities just listed be 
denominated as ‘powers.’ Such powers theorists, then, include but are not 
limited to: Barbara Vetter, Jonathan D. Jacobs, Alexander Pruss, Bryan Leftow, 
Andrea Borghini, and Neil E. Williams. While their respective definitions of 
possibility differ from one another in their detailed formulations, all of the above 
philosophers’ theories share a common proposal. Letting p be a variable ranging 
over propositions, the common proposal can be roughly characterized through 
the following biconditional:  
(PB): p iff there exist powers to bring it about that p.22  
 As suggested, this statement of the common proposal is inexact in its 
characterization of the respective theories of the above philosophers. To quickly 
see the way in which it is shared by each theory, it is perhaps best to examine 
                                                 
21 Again, I use “disposition” and “dispositional property” synonymously. 
22 (PB) for “Proposed Biconditional”. 
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partial formulations of their individual theories: 
“[S]ome proposition or truth T is possible just in case there is some 
actually 
instantiated property (or property complex) that is a power for some 
other property (or property complex) that would be a truthmaker for T.” 
(Jacobs 2010, pg. 236) 
“It is possible that p if and only if something has (or some things have) an 
iteratedpotentiality for it to be the case that p.” (Vetter, forthcoming) 
“. . . it is causally possible that P = df.  
a. it is, was, will be or timelessly-is the case that P, or 
b. something has (or timelessly-has, or some things jointly have or 
timelessly-have) the power and opportunity to bring it about that P, . . .” 
(Leftow 2012, pg. 352) 
“. . . a proposition p is possible0 if and only if p is true. Then for i>0, say 
that p is possiblei if there exists (timelessly, in the past, present or future) 
an actual item A (past, present, future or timeless) that has the causal 
capability for bringing it about that p is possiblei-1, . .” (Pruss 2011, pg. 
213). 
“State-of-affairs S is possible iff there is some actual disposition d whose 
manifestation is (or includes) S.” (Williams and Borghini 2008, pg. 26) 
 As noted in the previous section, MD is the view put forward by Williams 
and Borghini, and is a version of a powers theory of modality. From their 
writings, it is clear that all of these philosophers intend to state either what it is 
for a proposition or state-of-affairs to be possible, or what entities play the role 
of modal truthmakers, when they issue the above definitions and biconditionals. 
14 
 
For example, Brian Leftow’s definition of possibility is an Aristotelian definition 
in that it states what it is for a proposition to be causally possible. The 
biconditional supplied by Williams and Borghini is intended to identifiy 
dispositions as the truthmakers for propositions of the form <It is possible that S 
obtains> where S is a state-of-affairs. The right hand side of each biconditional is 
intended to be more than extensionally adequate in picking out all possible 
propositions or states-of-affairs. 
 The relationship posited in (PB) between causally potent entities (be they 
dispositions, powers, capabilities, etc.) and possibility is largely the same as that 
posited by Aristotle. The Aristotelian heritage of their respective views is a fact 
explicitly noted by many, if not all, of the above powers theorists. For example, 
modal dispositionalist Barbara Vetter notes that on her view of dispositions, 
entities that are integral to her view of modality, “may well be the more 
traditional approach applied by Aristotle and his followers to the related notion 
of dynamis.”23 Alexander Pruss explicitly labels his view of modality the 
Aristotelian-Leibnizian view, and devotes several pages to Aristotles’ view as it 
specifically relates to his (Pruss’s) overall project.24 Jonathan Jacobs offers his 
own detailed view of modality and suggests it can successfully be situated 
within a systematic metaphysic, concluding, “It is time for us to return to our 
philosophical home in a metaphysics of substances and powers – the 
metaphysics of Aristotle, whose yoke is easy and whose burden is light.”25  
 While powers theorists recognize their theories include ideas once 
                                                 
23 Barbara Vetter, “Dispositions Without Conditionals,” Mind 123, (2014): 131. 
24 Alexander Pruss, Actuality, Possibility, and Worlds (New York: The Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2011). 
25 Jonathan Jacobs, “A Powers Theory of Modality—Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Reject Possible Worlds,” Philosophical Studies 151 (2010): 246. 
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proposed by Aristotle, there is seldom extended discussion of exactly how these 
ideas are Aristotelian. That is, powers theorists seldom examine Aristotle’s work 
on modality in any great detail, let alone provide side-by-side comparison of 
their respective views with his. Of course, this is hardly a strike against the work 
of powers theorists. It is simply not their project to exegete Aristotle’s texts, and 
there are others who have taken up the task. Indeed, Aristotle scholars have 
amassed a tremendous literature on his views on modality as well as a panoply 
of other topics. 
 While a comparison with Aristotle’s works is not essential to the 
development of a powers theory of modality, I suggest that it has the potential to 
bolster it by making explicit the central commitments that all of the different 
powers theories share with their intellectual predecessor, Aristotle. In this way, 
much of what unifies the different powers theories, including modal 
dispositionalism, can be made clearer.  Additionally, a close comparison with 
Aristotle’s views may suggest needed revisions to current formulations of 
powers theories. As there appears to be no comparison of this sort, the 
beginning of one is provided in this section.  
 
3.2 MD and AM as Truthmaker Theories 
 
3.2.1 Modal Dispositionalism as Truthmaker Theory 
As noted in the previous section, modal dispositionalism is a truthmaker 
theory about modal truths. More specifically, the modal dispositionalist puts 
forward a theory about what makes propositions about possibilities and 
16 
 
necessities true.26 The modal dispositionalist’s account of modal truthmakers 
begins by providing a positive account of possibility. Recall: 
(MD): A state-of-affairs S is possible iff there exists a disposition d whose 
manifestation is or includes S.27 
 In this section, I briefly expound on MD, explaining how it is a claim 
about the truthmakers for modal claims and noting what features are essential 
to modal dispositionalism.  
First, consider the left side of the biconditional, MD. It seems to refer to a 
state-of-affairs. On one conception of states-of-affairs, they are proposition-like 
entities in that they are abstract and represent the world as being a particular 
way. Examples are Josh’s being a Masters student and Elephants having stampeded 
through A&M’s campus. The former state affairs obtains. The latter does not 
obtain. Alternatively, states-of-affairs can be taken to be concrete entities, 
sometimes called Davidsonian states-of-affairs. 
The modal dispositionalist need not be committed to one view of states-
of-affairs over another. Indeed, talk of states-of-affairs could be seen as a place-
holder for whatever ultimate constituents of reality there are. For example, 
powers-theorist Alexander Pruss notes that every declarative sentence has a 
corresponding participial nominalization.28 To “Rufus is a dog” corresponds 
“Rufus being a dog.” To “There are philosophers” corresponds “There being 
philosophers.” The modal dispositionalist can remain almost entirely neutral as 
                                                 
26 Of course, in the process of providing truthmakers for propositions about possibility and 
necessity, they will also provide insight into the truthmakers for counterfactuals so long as there 
is in fact a connection between these modal notions. 
27 Andrea Borghini and Neil E. Williams, “A Dispositional Theory of Possibility.” Dialectica 62, 
no. 1 (2008). 
28 Alexander Pruss, Actuality, Possibility, and Worlds, (New York: The Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2011), 6. 
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to what kind of objects participial nominalizations refer. For example, what kind 
of object “Rufus being a dog” denotes, whether it is ultimately a complex “of 
substances and their attributes, or of events, or a fact in a world that is all that is 
the case”,29 is a matter on which the modal dispositionalist need not come down 
hard. 
 Modal dispositionalists are serious actualists, however, and so cannot 
take participial nominalizations as referring to non-existent objects.30 Talk of 
some state-of-affairs S that has not obtained will be construed as referring to 
either an actual, platonic state-of-affairs that has not obtained or else as fictional 
discourse. On the latter option, “S is possible” is presumably shorthand for 
something like, “There could be something that satisfies the concept (or 
description) expressed by “S”.” 
 I now turn to how the biconditional is to be understood. Begin by 
considering the following proposition:  
(1) It is possible that K-pop be the most-popular music genre. 
Let S be the state-of-affairs K-pop being the most-popular music genre. I take it that 
(1) is equivalent to the proposition <It is possible that S obtains.>.31 On MD, it is 
possible that S obtains if and only if: 
(2) There is a disposition d whose manifestation is or includes S.  
 The nature of dispositions will be explored further in section 3.3. For now, 
it is sufficient to note that (2), for the modal dispositionalist, is to be taken as a 
genuine existential claim about an entity, d. That is, ‘d’ denotes an entity. The 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Gabriella Contessa calls powers theories “hardcore actualism.” Gabriele Contessa, “Modal 
Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism.” Synthese 174 (2010): 341. 
31 I will use “<s>” as shorthand for the proposition expressed by s, where s is a sentence. 
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modal dispositionalist is a realist about dispositional entities. 
In offering MD, it is important to note that the modal dispositionalist is 
intending to provide more than just an extensionally adequate semantics for 
necessity and possibility. It is not intended merely to correctly pick out the 
genuinely possible states-of-affairs. Instead, it is intended to state what makes a 
state-of-affairs possible. Shifting focus from states-of-affairs to propositions of 
the form, <State-of-affairs S is possible>, MD is intended to provide what makes 
such propositions true. The entity in the world that makes a proposition true is 
that proposition’s truthmaker. For example, <There is an ice-cube in my coffee> is 
made true by the ice-cube in my coffee, or depending on one’s ontology, by the 
state-of-affairs the ice-cube being in my coffee. That <There is a horse in the 
pasture> is made true by each horse that is in the pasture, or by the appropriate 
states-of-affairs involving horses in the pasture. The relation of making true is 
typically held to be entailment. That is, truthmakers entail the propositions they 
make true simply by existing. The modal dispositionalist seems to endorse 
truthmaker theory, according to which at least some true propositions are made 
true by some actual entity.32 They need not endorse truthmaker maximalism, 
according to which all true propositions are made true by an entity, however.  
Having provided a positive account of possibility, and on the assumption 
that necessity can be defined as that which is not possibly not the case, we may 
then provide a corresponding conditional for necessity: 
(MDN): A state-of-affairs S is necessary iff there is no disposition d whose 
manifestation is or includes S not obtaining.  
                                                 
32 See, for instance, Chad Vance, “In Defense of the New Actualism: Dispositional Modal 
Truthmakers and the Branching Conception of Possibility,” (PhD thesis, University of Colorado, 
2013).  
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 Following David Yate’s formal convention, we can provide a close 
translation of MD and MDN in predicate logic. First, let  be a variable for a 
disposition. Next, Rather than include a variable for a state-of-affairs, it is more 
convenient (for reasons that will become clearer in section 4.2) if we instead let p 
be a variable for any proposition of the form, <State-of-affairs S obtains>.33 Let 
∃p stand for <there is a disposition that brings about p>. We may then 
formulate as follows: 
(MDFORMAL):  p ≡ ∃p
(MDN-FORMAL): □p ≡ ∃p 
 Having further explicated MD, I now turn to showing how MD is 
implicitly endorsed by Aristotle. 
   
3.2.2 Aristotle on Possibility, Potency, and AM as Truthmaker Theory 
 In the Metaphysics, especially in Metaphysics IX, Aristotle endorses a 
particular relationship between possibility and potency (dunamis).34 In this 
section, I argue that Aristotle is committed to a biconditional relationship 
between potency (dunamis) and possibility and that this biconditional is best 
understood as a truthmaker theory of modal claims. This biconditional is very 
much like MD and can be formulated thusly:  
(AM) A state-of-affairs S is possible iff there is a potency p to bring it 
about that S.  
                                                 
33 Again, it is open to the modal dispositionalist to paraphrase “state-of-affairs” talk in a way that 
makes explicit their preferred ontology. I keep with “state-of-affairs” talk to remain true to 
Borghini and Williams’ formulation, as they are the representative of modal dispositionalism I 
have (somewhat arbitrarily) chosen.  
34 I include the equivalent Greek term used by Aristotle when the term has a technical meaning 
or when it aids in clarity. 
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 Consider first the left-hand side of the biconditional. AM is not intended 
to suggest that Aristotle would countenance states-of-affairs in his ontology. As 
with MD, the interpretation of AM is flexible enough to accommodate an 
interpretation that takes the convenient locution “state-of-affairs S” to be 
shorthand for picking out substances and their attributes, arguably the only 
types of entities admitted into Aristotle’s ontology. For example, “Mary being 
angry is possible . . .” can be taken as shorthand for “It is possible that Mary 
exemplify the immanent universal anger . . . “. As to the right-hand side, I 
explore the nature of potencies (dunameis) more thoroughly section 3.3.4. Here, I 
present only minimal characterization of potencies as needed to support the 
primary argument that Aristotle affirms AM and counts it as a modal 
truthmaker theory.  
 While Metaphysics IX contains the primary discussion of AM, Metaphysics 
V.12 provides important insight into understanding this discussion. In 
particular, Metaphysics V.12 provides insight into Aristotle’s distinct concepts of 
dunamis and possibility. We are told that a dunamis is a potency or capacity to 
change another or to be changed, and that it is something in concrete objects: 
“[A dunamis is] the principle of process and change, either in another 
thing or in the same thing qua other. The art, for instance, of building is 
not present in what is built, whereas with the art of medicine, it may, 
since it is a potentiality [dunamis], be present in the person being healed, 
but not qua a person being healed. So what is a principle of change or 
process in this way is said to be a potentiality [dunamis], whether in 
something else or in the thing itself qua something else.”35 
                                                 
35  (Metaphysics Book V.12 1019a) Aristotle, Metaphysics, Translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancred 
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 Aristotle goes on to provide several senses of possibility, saying: 
 “. . . the possible, is when the contrary is not necessarily false. For 
example, it is possible that a man should be seated, because it is not 
necessarily false that he should not be seated. Hence the term possible 
means in one sense (as has been stated), whatever is not necessarily false; 
and in another sense, whatever is true; and in still another, whatever may 
be true.”36  
 
 The first sense defines the possible as that which is not necessarily not the 
case. This is unlikely to be the sense of possibility found in AM and affirmed in 
Book IX, however. This is because in endorsing AM in Book IX, Aristotle provides 
a positive account of possibility, and so it is necessity that is to be negatively 
defined in terms of possibility, not the other way around. For example, if one 
accepts the modest assumption that necessity can be defined as that which is not 
possibly not the case, then from AM, we get: 
(AM-Necessity) A state-of-affairs necessarily obtains iff there exists no 
potency to bring it about that S not obtain.  
 It seems, then, that the relevant sense of possibility is either “whatever is 
true” or “whatever may be true.” While Aristotle’s more developed theory of 
modality may accommodate the former sense (“whatever is true”), it is clear that 
the right-hand side of AM only accommodates the latter.37 The “may” of “may 
be true” is presumably not to be understood as the epistemic operator “for all 
we know.” Rather, “whatever may be true” is plausibly understood as 
                                                                                                                                                
(London: Penguin Group, 1998). 
36 (Metaphysics Book V.12 1019b) Ibid. 
37 I argue for this further in the next section. 
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“whatever can become true”, or, in other words, “whatever can be brought 
about.”  
 So then, a state-of-affairs is possible in the sense that it can be brought 
about, i.e. be made to obtain.38 A potency is a thing that is characterized at least 
by its function, i.e. as that which is responsible for change, whether that change 
be in the entity that possesses the potency or in another entity. Given these 
simple understandings of potency and possibility, it seems clear that AM is 
intended to state what the truthmakers are for possibility claims. For given the 
understanding of possibility, AM can be rephrased to read, “A state-of-affairs S 
can be brought about iff there exists a potency p to bring it about that S.” 
Further, given the definition of potency, p is that which is responsible for 
bringing S about. In other words, the very nature of p necessitates that <if p 
exists, then p is responsible for bringing about S>. This is just to say that < p 
exists> entails that <state-of-affairs S can be brought about.>. It follows from the 
definition of a truthmaker that p is the truthmaker for this proposition.   
 Thus far, I have provided textual support that Aristotle makes a 
distinction between claims about that which is possible (dunatos) and claims 
about potency (dunamis). I have also suggested that if Aristotle endorses the 
biconditional AM, then Arisotle has a truthmaker theory about modal 
propositions, as AM just is such a theory. In the next sub-section, I argue that in 
Metaphysics IX, Aristotle implicitly endorses AM by endorsing two conditionals 
whose conjunction is equivalent to AM.  
 
                                                 
38 This sentence is not purported to contain a definition of possibility, but only a synonymous 
paraphrase of possibility. Hence, the phrase “simple understandings” and not “simple definitions” 
is used below in the same paragraph.  
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3.2.3 Aristotle’s Affirmation of AM in Metaphysics IX 
 In Metaphysics Book IX.3, Aristotle argues against the position of the 
Megarians, who maintain “that a thing has a potency (dunamis) for acting only 
when it is acting, and that when it is not acting it does not have this potency.”39 
According to the Megaric school of thought, a potency exists only when it is 
being exercised. So, “for example, one who is not building does not have the 
power of building, but only one who is building when he is building; and it is 
the same in other cases.”40 In this way, the Megarians reject Aristotle’s distinction 
between potentiality and actuality.  
 In response, Aristotle offers three reductiones ad absurdum of their 
position. As his third reductio, Aristotle contends that the Megarian view, were 
it true, would do away with motion and generation altogether. He writes,  
“Again, if that which is deprived of potency (dunamis) is incapable 
(adunatos), that which is not happening will be impossible (adunatos) of 
happening; but he who says of that which is impossible (adunatos) of 
happening that it is or will be will say what is untrue; for this is what 
impossible (adunatos) meant. Therefore these views do away with both 
movement and becoming.”41  
 
                                                 
39 (Metaphysics IX.3 1046b). Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 
Translated by John P. Rowan, (Library of Living Catholic Thought. (no publication date 
provided)). 
40 Ibid. 
41 (Metaphysics 1047a 11-14). This translation is adopted with modification from Aristotle, 
Complete Works of Aristotle, Translated by W.D. Ross and edited by Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton 
University Press, 1984). Whereas the 1984 translation renders the second adunatos as “incapable” 
I translate it as impossible, for reasons discussed. I also translate dunamis as potency, for 
consistency. 
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 Adunatos can be translated as either “incapable” or “impossible”, or as 
one of several close correlates. For example, John P. Rowan translates the last 
“adunatos” as “impossible or incapable,” Hugh Lawson-Tancred as “lack of 
capacity.”42 Where Aristotle writes “that which is deprived of potentiality is 
adunatos”, it appears that “adunatos” can be rightly translated as “incapable”. 
This is because Aristotle appears to simply be offering a statement of the role of 
dunamis as put forward in Book V, i.e. that which is responsible for change. He is 
saying in this quote that anything that lacks a potency for some particular 
change is incapable of undergoing that change.   
 Admittedly, it is not clear what distinction, if any, the above translators 
wish to draw between impossibility and incapability. Regardless, I maintain that 
the second and third instances of “adunatos”, found above, are rightly 
understood as Aristotle’s notion of possibility as found in Book V, i.e. that which 
is able to be brought about by some means or another. Demonstrating that these 
instances of “adunatos” are rightly understood as “possibility” is significant 
towards demonstrating Aristotle’s implicit endorsement of AM. For if 
“possibility” is the correct translation of these instances, then Aristotle seems to 
be endorsing the following conditional:  
(AM-1) If there is no potency p to bring about state-of-affairs S, then it is 
not possible that S obtain. 
This, of course, is logically equivalent to: 
(AM-1*) If it is possible that S obtain, then there is a potency p to bring 
                                                 
42Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Translated by John P. Rowan, 
(Library of Living Catholic Thought. (no publication date provided)).; Aristotle, Metaphysics, 
Translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancred, (London: Penguin Group, 1998). 
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about state-of-affairs S.    
 AM-1* is the left-to-right direction of AM, and its conjunction with AM-2* 
(below) is logically equivalent with AM. 
 What reason, then, is there to think that adunatos ought to be understood 
as Book V’s impossibility? Recall from the last section that Aristotle offered three 
senses of possibility (dunatos): (1) whatever is not necessarily false; (2) whatever 
is true; and (3) whatever may be true. (1) was rejected for reasons given in the 
last section. (2) does not countenance the element of change or motion present in 
Aristotle’s discussion, and so is likewise inadequate. By process of elimination, 
we arrive at the conclusion that the relevant sense of possibility is sense (3). On 
the assumptions that Aristotle’s list of the senses of possibility is exhaustive in 
Book V and that impossibility is definable in terms of possibility, then adunatos 
expresses the notion of impossibility found in Book V. So, Aristotle affirms AM-
1*. 
 Aristotle appears to straightforwardly affirm the left-to-right direction of 
AM, as well, when he says,  
“a thing has a potency [for doing something] if there is nothing 
impossible in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have the 
potency. I mean for instance, if a thing is capable of sitting and it is open 
to it to sit, there will be nothing impossible in its actually sitting.”43  
 The first sentence expresses a general formula and the second sentence is 
an instance of that formula. Again, translating to talk of states-of-affairs, the 
formula certainly appears to be: 
                                                 
43 (Metaphysics IX.3 1047a24) This translation is adopted with modification from Aristotle, 
Complete Works of Aristotle, Translated by W.D. Ross and edited by Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
26 
 
(AM-2) If there is a potency p to bring about state-of-affairs S, then it is 
not impossible that S obtain. 
This, of course, is equivalent to: 
(AM-2*) If there is a potency p to bring about state-of-affairs S, then it is 
possible that S obtain. 
 The conjunction of AM-1* and AM-2* is logically equivalent to AM. 
Therefore, Aristotle implicitly endorses AM insofar as he explicitly endorses 
conditionals AM-1 and AM-2. Having demonstrated this latter point, I now turn 
to specifying the nature of dispositions and potencies, the modal truthmakers on 
MD and AM, respectively. 
 
3.3 Dispositions as Modal Truthmakers 
 As we have seen, according to MD, dispositions are the truthmakers for 
modal claims. Proponents of MD, then, are realists about dispositional 
properties. That is, they maintain that dispositional properties exist. 
Dispositional properties are essentially and irreducibly modal. So then, insofar 
as MD accounts for the truth of modal claims by appeal to irreducibly modal 
entities, MD is a non-reductive account of modality. In the next three sections, I 
expound on the nature of dispositional properties. 
 
3.3.1 Disposition Talk is Talk about Dispositional Properties 
When providing explanations of what goes on in the world, we often use 
dispositional concepts. For instance, one may explain the breaking of a vase by 
suggesting that the vase broke because it was fragile and was struck. The 
zoologist might explain the behavior of an alligator saying, “The alligator 
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became angry because it is irascible.” The physicist may suggest that the electron 
jumped valence levels because it is charged.    
Realists about dispositional properties often point to more-or-less 
ordinary explanations of the above sort in order to try and establish a prima 
facie case that individuals are committed to the existence of dispositional 
properties.44 These dispositionalists often suggest that people seem to ascribe 
dispositional properties both to individual entities and to kinds of substances. 
As further examples, take “This vase is fragile,” “This metal is malleable,” 
“Alligators are irascible,” “Trees are flammable,” etc. According to the 
dispositionalists, such statements have equivalent paraphrases that make the 
ascription of dispositional properties more evident. For example, “The vase has 
the disposition to break when struck,” “The metal has the disposition to bend when 
force is applied to it,” “Alligators have the disposition to be angry when 
provoked,” “Trees have the disposition to burn when sufficiently heated.”   
Contra dispositionalists, other theorists offer alternative paraphrases that 
seem to rid the above expressions of any terms that might be taken to denote 
dispositions, thereby ridding one who affirms the truth of these expressions of 
any commitment to dispositional properties. These theorists propose what has 
come to be called the conditional analysis of dispositions, according to which 
putative dispositions ascriptions are really just shorthand for conditionals of a 
certain form. Notable defenders of some form of the conditional analysis have 
been Ryle, Wittgenstein, and Carnap.45 Ryle (1949) offers the most basic 
                                                 
44 See, for instance, Stephen Mumford’s extensive treatment of the conditional analysis in Ch. 3 of 
Stephen Mumford, Dispositions, (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1998): 36-64. 
45 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (London, Hutchinson, 1949); Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and 
Brown Books, (United States: Harper & Row, 1958); Rudolph Carnap, Die Physikalische Sprache als 
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conditional analysis according to which disposition ascriptions are to be 
analyzed as follows: Where D is a disposition, E a test condition, and G a 
confirming reaction, x is D =df if x is E-ed, then x will G.46   
 Whether any of the above paraphrases is accurate is controversial47, and 
any argument to the effect that they are accurate would fall squarely within the 
philosophy of language. The details of such a discussion need not detain us 
here. It is sufficient to note that when dispositionalists assert “This vase is 
fragile,” they intend to communicate more than the conditional, “If this vase 
were struck, then this vase would break.” They additionally intend to 
communicate that there exists a dispositional property. Note, this is consistent 
with the dispositionalist affirming that the existence of a dispositional property 
entails a counterfactual about its bearer, as we shall see in the next section.  
 
3.3.2 Dispositions as Multi-Track and Modal Entities 
Some natural properties have causal roles. Dispositional essentialists 
think that at least some properties have their causal roles essentially, and so are 
irreducibly modal. Contrary to dispositional essentialists, categoricalists 
maintain that properties have no essential (non-trivial) modal character.48 Modal 
dispositionalists are dispositional essentialists, and so maintain that certain 
                                                                                                                                                
Universalsprache der Wissenschaft, Translated by M. Black (London: Kegan Paul, 1934). 
46 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (London, Hutchinson, 1949). 
47 C.B. Martin, “Dispositions and Conditionals,” The Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 174 (1994): 1-8 
is perhaps the touchstone text for criticism of the conditional analysis of disposition ascriptions. 
For a recent defense of the conditional analysis, see Gabriele Contessa, “Dispositions and 
Interferences,” Philosophical Studies 165, no. 2 (2012).  
48 For a brief, helpful survey of the debate between dispositional essentialists and categoricalists, 
see the opening section of David Yates, “The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, no. 87, Issue 1 (2013). 
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properties are irreducibly modal. To begin to understand what it is to be 
irreducibly modal, consider that a dispositional property’s essential modal 
nature is most commonly expressed as a counterfactual conditional whose 
antecedent is its stimulus condition and whose consequent is its manifestation. 
There is dispute as to the specific relation between the dispositional property 
and its corresponding counterfactual conditional even among realists about 
dispositions,49 but realists widely agree that dispositions somehow entail 
counterfactual conditionals and that these conditionals best describe the nature 
of their corresponding disposition.50 Minimally, a property is a dispositional 
property only if it entails one or more counterfactual conditionals.  
 Take as an example the paradigm dispositional property, fragility.51 If an 
object x possesses the dispositional property fragility, not only do we say it is 
fragile but we can rightly infer the true counterfactual conditional that “if x were 
struck, then x would break”, where being struck is the stimulus condition of 
fragility and breaking its manifestation. But upon reflection, it becomes clear 
that fragility, like many other commonly ascribed dispositions, has multiple 
stimulus conditions as well as multiple manifestations. For instance, a jar of 
salsa that is fragile in virtue of having the dispositional property, fragility, would 
break were it dropped, or thrown against a wall, or submitted to extreme 
                                                 
49 J. Hawthorne & D. Manley, “Stephen Mumford. Dispositions,”Nous 39, no. 1 (2005): 180, “. . . 
Mumford argues that the reductive project is bound to fail but that, nevertheless, one can 
distinguish dispositional from categorical ascriptions by the fact that a certain kind of 
counterfactual is a priori entailed by the former.” 
50 Though, see Barbara Vetter, “’Can’ Without Possible Worlds: Semantics for Anti-Humeans,” 
Philosopher’s Imprint 13, no. 16 (2013). 
51 Of course, those who hold to a sparse view of properties, or who take fragility to be non-
natural and deny the existence of such non-natural properties, will take this “paradigm” 
example to be more aptly described as a “toy” example. This is fine, as not much hinges on this 
particular example. 
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temperature changes, or exposed to the appropriate pure tone, etc. Moreover, its 
fragility may be manifested in a variety of ways, i.e. by shattering, splintering, 
cracking, buckling, splitting down the middle, etc.  As this is the case, a single 
counterfactual conditional is not capable of adequately capturing fragility’s 
qualitative nature. Fragility is a so-called multi-track disposition. Call a 
disposition that is not adequately characterized by a single counterfactual 
conditional because it yields various manifestations or manifests under various 
stimulus conditions a multi-track disposition.  
 I take it as relatively straightforward that any multi-track disposition is 
thickly-charactered.52 An entity is thickly or multiply-charactered just in case it 
has more than one non-formal attribute, where an attribute is the entity that 
characterizes an entity (i.e. “attribute” is neutral between property theories).53 
Under various, qualitatively diverse circumstances or upon subjugation to 
various events, depending on what one takes the sort of stimulus condition to 
be, the disposition yields a manifestation. If it yields multiple, qualitatively 
diverse manifestations then so much the thicker, for then not only is it such that it 
“responds” to many (perhaps infinitely many) qualitatively diverse stimuli, but 
it is also such that it produces/brings about its qualitatively diverse 
manifestations. A single multi-track disposition can make many (perhaps 
                                                 
52The term “thickly-charactered” and its definition are borrowed from several of Robert Garcia’s 
works in the metaphysics of property theory. See, for example, Robert Garcia, “Tropes as 
Character Grounders: Modifier Tropes and Module Tropes,” (not currently in publication), 
wherein Garcia uses the term “thickly-charactered” and close correlates, and extensively 
develops the concept of thick-character. See also Robert Garcia, “Two Ways to Particularize a 
Property,” (not currently in publication) where the terms “thick”, “thickening”, etc. are used to 
described the character of tropes.   
53 “Multiply-charactered” and its definition are likewise borrowed from Robert Garcia. Ibid. (see 
footnote 52). 
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infinitely many) logically distinct counterfactual conditionals, with qualitatively 
diverse stimulus conditions as their respective antecedents, true. For example, 
where x is a bearer of fragility, fragility makes true the propositions: <If x were 
thrown against the wall, x would break>; <if x were dropped, x would crack>; <if 
x were smashed with a hammer, x would shatter>; etc. Many other putative 
dispositions appear to be multi-track, e.g. flammability, irascibility, solubility, 
etc. Flammability seems to be a multi-track disposition whose stimulus 
condition is qualitatively variable but whose manifestation remains the same. 
That it exists seems to entail a host of counterfactual conditionals about its 
bearer, x: <If x were exposed to the sun, then x would ignite>, <if x were 
simultaneously exposed to polystyrene and benzene, then x would ignite>, <if x 
were stuck with a red-hot poker, then x would ignite>, <if x were rubbed across 
a rough surface, then x would ignite>, etc. 
 An obvious upshot of there being multi-track dispositional properties is 
that a single property of this sort can serve as a truthmaker for multiple 
possibility claims (and so, by extension, necessity claims). For example, given 
the above multi-track characterization of fragility, the possession of fragility by 
an entity x would presumably make true the proposition <possibly, x breaks>, 
<possibly, x shatters>, etc.    
 A modal dispositionalist need not maintain that there are multi-track 
dispositional properties, however. For it may be that the only dispositional 
properties are those whose stimulus conditions and manifestation are neither 
qualitatively nor quantitatively diverse. These properties would have fully 
determinate stimulus conditions and manifestations. Different dispositions of this 
sort would have quantities (in the case of dispositional properties belonging to 
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physical concretia) and relata that were unique to themselves, as part of their 
stimulus conditions and manifestations. For example, disposition d is such that if its 
bearer were to receive a consistent 95J/s over .657 seconds, then it would manifest 
76J/s over .785s. Of course, this is a toy example, as there are likely many more 
determinate features of the stimulus and manifestation that would likely be needed 
to ensure lack of diversity. Were the stimulus conditions and manifestations so fully 
determinate as to be time-indexed, for example, then it seems each dispositional 
property would make at most one proposition true. 
 
3.3.3 Dispositions as Irreducibly Modal Entities 
 So then, dispositional properties entail one or more counterfactual 
conditionals about the entities that bear them. The reason dispositional 
properties entail these counterfactual conditionals about their bearers is because 
they cause the events expressed in the consequents of the conditionals. They 
cause the events because it is simply their nature to do so. Their modal nature is 
not due to any further physical or ontological structure (i.e. further properties), 
but is taken to be a brute fact about them. (Compare: in virtue of what is a 
triangle a three-sided figure?) That fragility causes a response in its bearer under 
certain circumstances is simply because fragility just is the sort of thing that 
brings about that response under those circumstances.  
 Indeed, dispositional properties are largely defined functionally as the 
entities that cause their bearers to manifest certain events. Stephen Mumford 
seems to endorse something like the following definition of a dispositional 
property: 
 [DfM] P is a dispositional property =df P is a property had by some entity 
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x, and P is a cause of x R-ing if x is S-ed in conditions C.54   
 Or, consider David Lewis’s definition of a dispositional property:  
(LD) x is disposed to give response R to stimulus S if and only if, for some 
intrinsic property B possessed by x, if x were exposed to S and were to 
retain B for an appropriate interval, x’s being B would be an x-complete 
cause of x being R.55 
 According to Lewis, an object possesses a disposition just in case that 
object is such that it would manifest the response when exposed to the 
appropriate stimulus condition. Moreover, x’s intrinsic property B is all that is 
needed for x to manifest response R; x’s other intrinsic properties do not causally 
contribute to the manifestation of R. This latter point is captured by Lewis’s use 
of “x-complete cause”. Though not himself a dispositionalist, Lewis’s definition 
can be gladly adopted by dispositionalists so long as they resist his analysis of 
causation. This is because Lewis’s ultimate analysis excludes primitively modal 
entities. Instead, the dispositionalist needs to maintain that some disposition d 
causes some response R in condition S if and only if d’s nature is such that it 
would cause R were it in condition S, and further that d’s nature is irreducibly 
modal.  
 In this section, I have simply explained how dispositional properties are 
multi-track and irreducibly modal in nature. In the next section, I argue that 
Aristotle understands potencies (dunameis) to have these same features. 
    
 
                                                 
54 Stephen Mumford, Dispositions, (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1998): 135. 
55 David Lewis, “Finkish dispositions,” The Philosophical Quarterly, no. 4 (1997). 
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3.3.4 Aristotle’s Truthmakers – Potencies as Multi-Track and Irreducibly 
Modal 
 Aristotle appears to endorse AM as a truthmaker theory about modal 
truths. The entities that play the role of truthmaker are potencies (dunameis). In 
this section, I primarily examine Metaphysics IX.2 and IX.5, and argue that 
Aristotle’s potencies, like the dispositions of the modal dispositionalists, are 
multi-track and irreducibly modal in nature. 
 That an entity is irreducibly modal entails that it has modal features.56 
One begins to see what the modal features of potencies are upon consideration 
of Aristotle’s account of change in the Physics. The role potencies play in the 
process of change reveals that they have stimulus conditions and manifestations, 
and so seem to entail counterfactuals about their bearers. 
 In Physic I.7, Aristotle tells us that change involves three entities: matter, a 
positive form, and a privative form. “anything involved in “becoming” is always 
complex: there is what comes into being [for example, one “educated”]; and 
there is, in what undergoes such a  change, a double aspect, namely, the 
persistent being (for example, a “man”) and an opposite (for example, the 
“uneducated”).57 In Physics III.2, we find that it is the entity that conveys the 
positive form that is counted as responsible for the change, “a mover always 
conveys a definite form, such as a primary being or a quality or a quantity, and it 
is in terms of this fundamental factor, the form, that the movement which the 
mover imparts is to be construed.”58 The entity that conveys the forms has the 
                                                 
56 Of course, it further entails that these features are themselves irreducibly modal. 
57 Physics 190b10-15. Aristotle, Aristotle’s Physics, Translated by Richard Hope, (United States of 
America: The University of Nebraska Press, 1961). 
58 Physics 202a10-12. Ibid. 
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potency to do so, but this potency only affects the change when there exists a 
reciprocal potency in the patient (the entity being affected).59 For instance, the 
active potency of an electron to charge other electrons can only be expressed 
where there exists within the patient electron the passive potency to be charged. 
 What this means, then, is that both active and passive potencies are such 
that they react under certain stimulus conditions, i.e. the presence of their 
reciprocal potency. Moreover, they jointly manifest a change at least within the 
bearer of the passive potency. If this is so, then each potency will entail a 
subjunctive conditional in the same way as do dispositional properties. Indeed, 
potency just seems to be a particular species of the disposition genus.  
 Aristotle’s treatment of potencies in Metaphysics IX.2 and IX.4 make it 
clear that reciprocal partner potencies are not always sufficient stimulus 
conditions for a potency to manifest, however. His treatment further reveals that 
his potencies are multi-track, in that they yield various manifestations under 
various stimulus conditions. If this is so, then Aristotle’s potencies will serve as 
truthmakers for multiple modal truths, again, in the same way as do 
dispositional properties. 
 Consider, then, Metaphysics IX.2. There, Aristotle draws the distinction 
between rational and non-rational potencies. This distinction is relatively 
straightforward, as rational potencies are simply those that belong exclusively to 
rational beings qua rational beings. For example, Socrates has the potency to 
break things, to warm things, and to engage in philosophy. The former potencies 
are non-rational, as they can also be possessed by non-rational things like rocks, 
fire, etc. The latter capacity is a rational capacity.  
                                                 
59 (Metaphysics IX.1, 1046a11-13). 
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 Rational potencies, we are told, are “capable of contrary effects, but one 
non-rational power produces one effect.”60 For example, a doctor may choose to 
exercise his rational medical art (i.e. type of potency), but this art may manifest 
in either the healing or the harm of the individual patient. Additionally, in IX.4, 
we are told that which contrary change is manifested by a rational potency 
depends on the desire of the bearer of that rational potency. “Therefore 
everything which has a rational potentiality (dunamis), when it desires that for 
which it has a potentiality (dunamis) and in the circumstances in which it has it, 
must do this.”61 Hence, a single potency manifests under multiple stimulus 
conditions. For Aristotle, what individuates a rational capacity is not the 
manifestation and stimulus conditions, then, but the common rational 
understanding of each of the contrary forms.   
 Aristotle provides little defense of the claim that non-rational dispositions 
are single-track dispositions. However, it may be thought that his views on 
causation, if true, lend support to his claim.62 The thought is that potencies are 
that which ultimately bring about changes, and so they are plausibly 
individuated in the same way that changes are individuated. Moreover, if it is 
not by the changes they bring about that non-rational potencies are 
individuated, then it is not clear what could individuate them. Aristotle tells us 
that numerically distinct changes are of the same species when the property they 
                                                 
60 (Metaphysics 1046b5-6). Aristotle, Complete Works of Aristotle, Translated by W.D. Ross and 
edited by Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton University Press, 1984). 
61  (Metaphysics 1048a13-14). Ibid. 
62 Stephen Makin proposes such a defense in Stephen Makin, “Aristotle on Modality, How Many 
Ways Can a Capacity Be Exercised?” Proceedings of the Aristoterlian Society, Supplementary 
Volumes, no. 74 (2000): 151-152. 
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bring about in their patient is not further determinable.63 For example, a rock 
becoming a determinate shade of green, a piece of bread turning that same 
shade of green, and a leaf turning that same shade of green are all instances of 
the same event species. Individuating non-rational potencies in this way, 
however, seems to allow for non-rational potencies to have multiple-
manifestations. While a single potency may produce the same property within 
multiple individuals, there is more to a manifestation than the form that is 
transferred. While Aristotle focuses on the transferred form in his account of 
change, the state-of-affairs that is brought about in numerically distinct transfers 
of the same property species will be qualitatively different. For instance, a rock 
turning forest green, a loaf of bread turning forest green, and a leaf turning forest green 
are qualitatively different states-of-affairs despite them all containing the 
transfer of the form, forest green. But then, non-rational potencies have multiple 
manifestations (and possibly stimulus conditions) and so are multi-track. They 
too will entail multiple counterfactual conditionals.   
 As with dispositional properties, it is in virtue of their irreducibly modal 
nature that potencies entail subjunctive conditionals about their bearers. 
Aristotle maintains that potencies are irreducibly modal entities. An argument 
for this claim can be stated as a simple syllogism: 
(1)  If Aristotle believes that modal facts about potencies are reducible to 
facts about their non-modal features, then this claim is found in his 
writings. [premise] 
(2) The claim is not found in his writings. [premise] 
                                                 
63  (Physics 227b 7-12). Aristotle, Aristotle’s Physics, Translated by Richard Hope, (United States of 
America: The University of Nebraska Press, 1961). 
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(3)  Aristotle does not believe modal facts about potencies are reducible to 
facts about their non-modal features. [modus tollens, 1,2] 
(4) If Aristotle does not believe modal facts about potencies are reducible 
to facts about their non-modal features, this is because he believes it is the 
nature of potencies that they are irreducibly modal. [premise] 
(5) Aristotle believes it is the nature of potencies that they are irreducibly 
modal. [modus ponuns 3,4] 
 That premise (1) is true is evidenced by the fact that Aristotle wrote 
extensively about potencies, not only in the Metaphysics but also throughout a 
number of his writings, particularly those on natural science. 64 Given his large 
treatment of the subject, one would expect that he would at least minimally state 
how the modal features of potencies are to be reduced if he thought this 
possible. To my knowledge, there is no such explication. 
 Instead, in support of premise (4), one finds Aristotle supplying what 
appear to be definitions of potencies that characterize them as primitively modal 
entities. (Premise (4) effectively says that Aristotle does not remain uncommitted 
as to whether or not potencies are irreducibly modal.) After expounding on 
potencies at length within the Physics and further in the Metaphysics, Aristotle 
summarizes his view of potencies of all sorts in Metaphysics IX.8,   
“. . . I mean by potentiality not only that definite kind which is said to be 
a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself regarded as 
other, but in general of every principle of movement or of rest. For nature 
also is in the same genus as potentiality; for it is a principle of movement 
                                                 
64 For a helpful overview of the role of potencies in Aristotle’s work on natural science, see Istvan 
Bodnar, "Aristotle's Natural Philosophy," In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 
Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), (Nov. 2014). 
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–not, however, in something else but in the thing itself qua itself.”65  
 In summarizing the nature of potencies simpliciter, Aristotle chooses to 
characterize them as those things that bring about change. He does not go on to 
suggest that these things bring about change in virtue of possessing some 
further physical structure, or any other non-modal feature. He also does not 
suggest that this might be the case—that, for all we know, further explanations of 
how potencies bring about change will one day be available. Instead, he rests 
with defining potencies functionally.  
 Aristotle’s description of nature in this passage is consistent with his 
descriptions found throughout the Physics. For example, in Physics II, Aristotle 
tells us how artifacts possess principles of change,   
“they [artifacts] do not have implanted within themselves any tendency 
to change; nevertheless, in so far as they happen to consist of stone or 
earth or a composite material, they do have such a beginning of 
movement and rest, but only in this respect. But even this circumstance 
gives evidence that the nature of a thing is in some sense the factor which 
initiates movement and rest within that thing in which it is itself 
immediately, not incidentally, present.”66  
 Why is it possible that artifacts undergo changes of various sorts? 
Aristotle is content to terminate his answer to this question with an appeal to 
natures, that which initiates movement and rest within a thing. No further 
explanation with appeal to further non-modal features is offered. As Istvan 
                                                 
65 (Metaphysics XI.8 1049b5-10). Aristotle, Complete Works of Aristotle, Translated by W.D. Ross and 
edited by Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton University Press, 1984). 
66 (Physics II 192b 18-23 approx.). Aristotle, Aristotle’s Physics, Translated by Richard Hope, 
(United States of America: The University of Nebraska Press, 1961). 
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Bodnar notes, “natures – beside the active and passive potentialities – are 
ultimate grounds in causal explanations.”67 
 These examples are but a few of many passages that describe potencies as 
being modal in nature. Moreover, there are no passages that suggest the modal 
character of potencies might be accounted for by non-modal features. Taken 
together, these facts suggest that premise (5) is true. 
 
3.4 Summary of Modal Dispositionalism’s Aristotelian Heritage 
 In this section, I aimed to show that MD is a neo-Aristotelian theory of 
modality in that both MD and AM are (1) truthmaker theories about modal 
propositions that (2) define necessity in terms of possibility, and (3) posit 
irreducibly modal, disposition-like entities as truthmakers. I did so by drawing 
from the views of prominent modal dispositionalists and by directly examining 
source texts of Aristotle. In so doing, I hope to have also made explicit part of 
the common, philosophic heritage shared by powers theorists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Istvan Bodnar, "Aristotle's Natural Philosophy," In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), (Nov. 2014). 
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4. TOWARDS EVALUATING MODAL DISPOSITIONALISM: 
CONSEQUENCES AND MODIFICATIONS 
 
4.1 The Actual Causal Connection Argument for MHC 
In this section, it is argued that modal dispositionalists are committed to 
MHC (below). A few revisions to MD are suggested in the process.  
(MHC): There exists an actual infinity of contingent objects.  
 MD commits the dispositionalist to the view that every metaphysical 
possibility is causally “connected” with the actual world, directly or indirectly.68 
Call this view the actual causal connection view, ACC.69 This is because MD, 
when correctly paraphrased, just is the view that for any state-of-affairs S, S is 
possible iff it is or would be the effect (i.e. manifestation or part thereof) of some 
cause (i.e. disposition). Moreover, as every actual state-of-affairs is possible, it 
follows that every actual state-of-affairs is a causal manifestation (or part 
thereof) of some disposition d that belongs to some concrete entity x.  If 
dispositionalists are committed to ACC, then dispositionalists are committed to 
MHC. Towards making ACC and its entailment of MHC clear, I suggest the 
                                                 
68 This brief, convenient way of stating ACC is not intended to communicate that 
dispositionalists are committed to merely possible entities, ala Meinongianism. Indeed, Borghini 
and Willliams more accurately express the opinion of dispositionalists in saying, “. . . it is 
recognized that when dispositions are manifested, the dispositions (or more correctly the 
dispositional properties that support them) stand in a causal relation to the manifestations. But 
when the dispositions are unmanifested, there is no relation at all, and so no mystery regarding 
what the relation is to. Thinking of unmanifested dispositions as relations to some mysterious 
non-existent manifestation might be one way of characterizing dispositions, but it is not one we 
endorse (nor does anyone else as best as we can tell). For this reason, we are not burdened with 
Meinongian entities.”  
69 ACC is largely based on an argument presented in Chad Vance, “In Defense of the New 
Actualism,” 105-109. There, Vance argues that, on dispositionalism, modality takes a branching 
structure such that every possible state-of-affairs is metaphysically grounded by a “causal 
property” in the actual world. 
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following two scenarios for consideration: 
Case 1: Suppose today is Christmas morning and I wake to find a lump of 
coal in my stocking. Suppose further that it is true that <The lump of coal could 
burst into flames>. On MD, what makes it true that <The lump of coal could 
burst into flames> is the lump’s disposition (presumably) to ignite. Now, 
imagine that it is in fact the case that my coal ignites. The actual state-of-affairs 
my lump of coal igniting, S, is made possible by the coal’s disposition to ignite (the 
manifestation of which just is S, in this case). This disposition is itself causal in 
nature because it is either identical to or caused by irreducible causal properties. 
On MD, the state-of-affairs my lump of coal igniting either contains the disposition 
to ignite (it must if causes are coincident with their effects) or it minimally was 
caused by it, in which case there is also a more inclusive situation comprising S 
and the disposition. In either case, S is metaphysically possible because it could 
be causally brought about by something actual (in this imagined case, it is in 
fact.).  
However, it would seem that not every metaphysically possible state-of-
affairs is capable of being immediately brought about by some causally 
efficacious entity.70 Some metaphysically possible states-of-affairs are more 
distant from actual states-of-affairs than others.   
Case 2: Imagine that my lump of coal does not actually ignite (but that it 
still has the disposition to do so) and that I leave it unattended in my stocking 
until New Year’s Eve. Clearly enough, on Christmas day, it is metaphysically 
possible that at some time before New Year’s Eve I drop the coal on my sweater 
and get black streaks on it. This state-of-affairs just described is possible because 
                                                 
70 Unless directly actualized by God, presumably. 
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I and the coal and whatever else have the requisite dispositions, the 
manifestation of which just is or includes me dropping coal on my sweater and 
getting black streaks on it. Before this possible state-of-affairs is available to be 
causally manifested, however, other possible states-of-affairs must first be 
manifested. For example, in order to have dropped the coal on my sweater, I 
must have first lifted the coal out of the stocking. For that state-of-affairs to 
manifest, I must have first extended my arm into the stocking. Prior still, I must 
have lifted the stocking down from the mantle, and so on. Of course, there are 
alternative chains of states-of-affairs that would make available the obtaining of 
my dropping the coal on my sweater. What is important, however, is that any chain 
of possible states-of-affairs that obtains, thereby enabling my dropping the coal on 
my sweater to obtain, will ultimately include a state-of-affairs that either contains 
or is directly caused by one or more of my actual causal dispositions. The simple 
chain just mentioned can be listed chronologically: My possessing the relevant 
dispositions(actually) > my lifting the stocking down from the mantle > my extending 
my arm into the stocking > My dropping the coal on my sweater. 
My dropping the coal on my sweater seems to be a genuinely possible state-
of-affairs. Moreover, it seems genuinely possible regardless of whether or not it 
actually obtains. Suppose it does not obtain, nor does any state-of-affairs 
containing a disposition whose manifestation is or includes my dropping the coal 
on my sweater. It follows on MD that this state-of-affairs is not possible. This 
suggests that MD needs to be modified to accommodate states-of-affairs that are 
more distant from actuality, yet still genuinely possible. Here, it may be 
beneficial to examine Alexander Pruss’s initial formulation of possibility. 
Although Pruss does not mention dispositions in the following description of 
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modal truthmakers, his formulation is helpful in that it makes explicit the 
relevant causal connectedness of these more “distant” states-of-affairs.71: 
“It is possible that s if and only if either s, or there is something that has 
the causal capability to make it be that s, or there is something that has 
the causal capability to make it be that there is something that has the 
causal capability to make it be that s, or … And we can summarize this by 
saying that a non-actual state-of-affairs is made possible by something 
capable of initiating a chain of causes leading up to that state-of-affairs.”72 
Iterated possibilities can be accommodated by modifying MD as follows: 
(MD+): State-of-affairs S is possible iff there is at least one actual 
disposition d, the manifestation of which is (or includes) S, or some 
disposition d1 whose manifestation is or includes a state-of-affairs 
S2 that includes a disposition d2, the manifestation of which is or 
includes S, or . . .  
 The states-of-affairs my lump of coal igniting and my dropping the coal on my 
sweater have no unique features that would prevent Case 1 and Case 2 from 
being properly generalized. Case 1 can be generalized to all metaphysical 
possibilities that are immediately actualizable as a manifestation or part of a 
manifestation of a causal disposition. Case 2 can be generalized to all 
metaphysical possibilities that are not directly actualizable but that are genuine 
possibilities nonetheless. As this is the case, it seems that ACC is true on both 
                                                 
71 As it turns out, Pruss does endorse an Aristotelian understanding of properties, whereby there 
are at least some that have irreducible, causal properties. 
72 Alexander Pruss, Actuality, Possibility, and Worlds (New York: The Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2011), 213. 
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MD and MD+.73  
How does endorsing ACC commit dispositionalists (those who endorse 
MD) to MHC, the claim that there exists a past infinity of contingent objects? To 
see how, begin with the plausible assumption that whatever is actual is also 
possible. This is not to modify MD, adding another condition to the right-hand 
side of the biconditional. Rather, it is just to say that all actual things are also 
possible things. But if this is so, then it follows that every actual state-of-affairs S 
is also possible. From the left to right direction of MD, it then follows that every 
actual state-of-affairs S, whether one that obtained 10 minutes ago or 10 million 
years ago, is such that it either is or is part of the manifestation of some 
disposition d.  
Now, consider the state-of-affairs S of d being G where d is a disposition 
and G an essential feature of d, i.e. d could not lack G and exist. On MD, S is the 
manifestation or part of the manifestation of some disposition. But S is not the 
manifestation of d, for that would imply that d causes itself to be G, and this is 
absurd.74 To see this, recall that d could not exist and fail to be G. So long as 
manifestations take place over a finite interval of time, it follows that were d to 
manifest d’s being G, d would cause itself to come into existence.75 This is absurd 
and so disposition d does not manifest S. But then, MD requires there be another 
temporally prior disposition d* whose manifestation is or includes S, and there 
                                                 
73 In the following discussion, I will continue to argue for the imiplications of MD, and not MD+. 
This is simply because the addendum found in MD+ is not crucial to the following arguments 
and because MD is the theory proposed by actual modal dispositionalist Borghini and Williams. 
74 Recall from discussion in section 3.3.3 that dispositions cause their manifestations. 
75 If the disposition is timeless, this argument for a infinite past regress would fail. It seems 
plausible that an argument for an infinite number of dispositions could be constructed through 
slight modification of the above. This argument need not assume that manifestations take place 
over a finite interval of time, and so is consistent with them being timeless.   
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is then a further state-of-affairs S* of d*’s being G*, where G* is an essential 
feature of d*. By parity of reasoning, MD requires that S* be the manifestation or 
part of the manifestation of some distinct disposition d’. From here, it is easy to 
see how an infinite past regress of dispositions and states-of-affairs follows.  
Note, this argument for MHC is independent of whether or not the modal 
dispositionalist countenances the existence of states-of-affairs. Recall from 
section 3.2.1 that the modal dispositionalist is not committed to the existence of 
states-of-affairs, for what is essential to the theory is what truthmakers are 
posited for modal truths.  So long as the connection between possibility and 
causal efficacy is preserved, not even a more radical reformulation of MD would 
free the modal dispositionalist from commitment to an infinite number of 
existents. For example, consider an ontology according to which there exist only 
concrete particulars. On such an ontology, the intuitive connection between 
causal efficacy and possibility underlying MD could perhaps best be preserved 
via a revision like the following:  MD’: Concrete particular c is possibly F iff 
there exists a concrete particular c* disposed to bring it about that c is F, where 
"F" should of course not be taken to pick out an abstract property but 
nonetheless "is F" is a true predicate of c. Concrete particular c* must pick out an 
entity distinct from c on the assumption that an entity cannot bring about its 
own existence. But then, by parity of the above reasoning, MD’ will require 
there be a further entity c’ responsible for bringing about c*, and an infinite 
regress follows. So, even on a quasi-modal dispositionalism that countenances 
only concrete particulars, it follows that there is an infinite number of concrete 
objects.76 
                                                 
76 Of course, that there are an infinite number of concrete particulars also follows on the 
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At this point, it is clear that as it stands, MD requires an infinite number 
of contingent dispositions to serve as modal truthmakers and ground the 
possibility of an infinite number of contingent states-of-affairs.77 Thus, MD 
requires the truth of MHC. Some may take the commitment to MHC to weigh 
against the ontological parsimony touted by dispositionalists. Others may take 
commitment to MHC to be a reductio of MD if they view an actual infinity to be 
metaphysically impossible.78 One way to avoid this consequence is by modifying 
MD to read as follows: 
(MD*) State-of-affairs S is possible iff either S is actual, or there is at least 
one actual disposition d, the manifestation of which is (or 
includes) S. 
This formulation obviates the need for an infinite number of dispositions 
by deeming a state-of-affairs possible so long as it is actual. This sufficient 
condition for metaphysical possibility makes MD* consistent with there being 
actual states-of-affairs that are not the manifestation of any disposition. These 
states-of-affairs may be eternal, timeless, or brought about by some entity other 
than dispositions. 
The modal dispositionalist can avoid commitment to one metaphysically 
heavy consequence by opting for MD* over MD. Section 4.3, however, contains 
                                                                                                                                                
assumption that dispositions must be had by some concrete object (e.g. are immanent universals, 
tropes had by a bare particular, tropes necessarily dependent on other tropes, etc.). 
77 At least, this is the case so long as it can never be that a state-of-affairs S1 containing 
disposition d is the manifestation of distinct disposition d2, AND state-of-affairs S2 containing d2 
be the manifestation of d. This is a plausible assumption. 
78 A discussion of why one might take an actual infinite to be metaphysically impossible would 
extend beyond the scope of this paper. For helpful discussion see William Lane Craig and James 
D. Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, 
ed. by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland (Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009) 103-125. 
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an argument that draws support from both MD and MD* and that has a distinct, 
metaphysically heavy conclusion. First, however, another reason for adopting 
MD* over MD is given. 
 
4.2 Adopting MD* for Formal Adequacy  
 In section 4.1, I suggested that one ought to prefer MD* over MD, as MD 
entails that there are an infinite number of contingent entities and that this is an 
unduly heavy consequence. Another reason to prefer MD* over MD is that, 
unlike MD*, MD does not validate axiom (K) or (T) and so is formally 
inadequate. Axiom (K) and (T) are both included in S5, which many take to be 
the correct system for metaphysical modality. Following the work of David 
Yates, I now show that MD does not validate (K) or (T). Subsequently, I show 
that MD* validates both (K) and (T).79 
 Towards showing the inadequacy of MD, begin by considering any 
analytic truth. Yates’s example is as good as any other. He has us consider an 
arithmetical truth, <2+2=4>. Presumably, there is no disposition whose 
manifestation is or includes the state-of-affairs the sum of 2 and 2 being 4. As this 
is so, no disposition makes true the proposition <2+2=4>. It may well be that all 
dispositions' manifestations are consistent with the state-of-affairs of the sum of 2 
and 2 being 4. Consistency with this state-of-affairs, of course, is not the same as 
                                                 
79 The formal demonstration in this section is adopted with only minor modification from David 
Yates, “Dispositionalism and the Modal Operators,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, no. 
89, Issue 1 (2014, forthcoming). The discussion of dispositions and counterfactual dependence is 
my own. I also include intermediate derivations that Yates leaves implicit in his work, and 
present the derivation in list form to streamline the argument for adopting MD*. Moreover, I 
arrived at MD* independently from Yates, guided by the common understanding of possibility, 
according to which that which is actual is also possible. Yates’s argument is a very nice 
complement to my own, found in the previous section. 
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bringing this state-of-affairs about. This becomes especially apparent when one 
recalls that dispositions are supposed to bring about their respective 
manifestations in the sense that they cause them. Surely, nothing causes 
<2+2=4> to be true. While the relation between cause and effect may be more 
than counterfactual dependence, it is nonetheless plausible that the following 
conditional holds between a cause C and effect E. 
C causes E only if: 
i. C occurs.  
 ii. E occurs. 
iii. Had C not occurred, E would not have occurred. 
 When C is a disposition manifesting and E a corresponding state-of-
affairs obtaining, then the counterfactual iii is presumably made true by the 
primitively modal disposition. It seems, however, that the state-of-affairs the sum 
of 2 and 2 being 4 in no way counterfactually depends on the manifesting of a 
disposition. 
 Again, it seems that no disposition entails the truth of <2+2=4>. By parity 
of reasoning, no disposition is responsible for the falsity of <(2+2=4)>. These 
statements can be formalized using the notation introduced in section 3.2.1. Let p 
be a variable for any proposition of the form, <State-of-affairs S obtains>.80 Let 
∃p stand for <there is a disposition that brings about p>. Recall that: 
(MDFORMAL):  p ≡ ∃p
(MDN-FORMAL): □p ≡ ∃p
                                                 
80 Again, it is open to the modal dispositionalist to paraphrase “state-of-affairs” talk in a way that 
makes explicit their preferred ontology. I keep with “state-of-affairs” talk to remain true to 
Borghini and Williams’ formulation, as they are the representative of modal dispositionalism I 
have (somewhat arbitrarily) chosen.  
50 
 
 The above discussion demonstrates premises 1 and 2. The following 
derivation is a point of reference for the derivations that are to follow. 
Derivation A: 
1.∃  Premise (above discussion) 
2.∃  Premise (above discussion) 
3.    Definition MDFORMAL, 1
4. □ (2+2=4)   Definition MDN-FORMAL, 2  
5. □ (2+2=4)  Interdefinability of modal operators, 3 
6. □ (2+2=4)  5
  
 The proposition, <(2+2=4)> , is a counterexample to Axiom (T): □p → p. 
The following derivation shows that (T) is invalid. 
Derivation B: 
7. 2+2=4   Premise  
8. □ (2+2=4)  6 
9.  (2+2=4)   (T) Axiom, 8 
10. (2+2=4) &  (2+2=4) 7, 9 
 
 Let p = <2+2=4>. Let q = <Josh is an MA student>, a contingent 
proposition. (K): □(p → q) → (□p → □q). The following derivation shows that 
(K) is invalid.  
Derivation C: 
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11.  ∃p & q  Premise (above discussion) 
12. ∃ q   Premise 
13. ∃p → q) 11 
14. □ (p → q)  Definition MDN-FORMAL, 13 
15. □p   4 
16. □p → □q  (K) Axiom, 14 
17. □q   15, 16 
18. q   Definition MDFORMAL 12 
19. □q   18 
20. □q   19 
21. □q & □q  17, 20 
 
 Premise 11 is true, because the truth of its negation would require there 
be a disposition to bring it about that <2+2=4>. There is no such disposition. 
Premise 13 is true given the definition of a contingent proposition. 
 Using the same notation as with MD, MD* can be formulated thus: 
(MD*FORMAL):  p ≡ p v∃p
(MD*N-FORMAL): □p ≡ p & ∃p
 Recall that (T): □p → p. (TCONTRAPOSITIVE): p → p. The following derivation 
shows that (T) follows from MD*.   
Derivation D: 
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22. (p  ∃p→ p MD*FORMAL, right to left 
23.   p    Assumption of conditional proof  
24.   p  ∃p  23 
25.   p   22, 24 
26.  p → p   Conditional Proof 23-25 
 
 Recall that (K): □(p → q) → (□p → □q). The below derivation shows 
that (K) follows from MD*. Before providing the derivation, I elaborate on the 
justification of one of the premises. 
Derivation E: 
 Line 34 is justified as follows: The conjunction of 28 and 30 entails the 
truth of <p> and <p → q>, as well as that there are no dispositions that can bring 
about the falsity of <p> and no dispositions that can bring about the falsity of <p 
→ q>. <p> and <p → q> jointly entail <q>. The disposition quantified over in 34, 
however, is such that it could bring about the falsity of q. If this disposition were 
to manifest, it would bring it about that either <p> or <p → q> were false. Line 34 
reflects this. 
 
27.   □ (p → q)    Assumption of conditional proof 
28.   (p → q) & ∃p → q)  Definition MD*N-FORMAL, 27 
29.     □p     Assumption of conditional proof 
30.     p & ∃p    Definition MD*N-FORMAL, 29 
31.    (p → q)     28 
32.     p     30 
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33.      ∃ q    Assumption of indirect proof 
34.      p  p → q)   *Defended Above*, 33 
35.      (p & p → q))   34 
36.      p & (p → q)    31, 32 
37.      [p & (p → q)] & [p & p → q)]   35, 36 
38.    ∃ q    Indirect proof 33-37 
39.    q      31, 32 
40.    q & ∃ q   38, 39 
41.    □q     MD*N-FORMAL, 40 
42.   □p → □q    Conditional proof 29-41 
43. □(p → q) → (□p → □q)  Conditional proof 27-42 
 
4.3 An Argument for a Necessary Being 
The modal dispositionalist can avoid commitment to one metaphysically 
heavy consequence by opting for MD* over MD. This section, however, contains 
an argument for the existence of a necessary being that draws support from both 
MD and MD*. Let a necessary being be one that exists either eternally or 
timelessly and that is such that nothing can bring about its non-existence. It 
seems appropriate to deem commitment to the existence of such a being as 
metaphysically heavy. This argument, unlike the argument from ACC, however, 
turns out not to be incumbent upon the modal dispositionalist. 
The argument:81 
                                                 
81 This argument is largely based on the objection Cameron (2008) poses to dispositionalism. He 
contends that the theory cannot supply truthmakers to broad modal truths, and so is deficient. 
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(P1) If the proposition <It is possible that none of the actual contingent 
beings existed> is true, then its truthmaker is the disposition of at 
least one necessary being. 
(P2) If the proposition’s truthmaker is the disposition of at least one 
necessary being, then at least one necessary being exists. 
(P3) The proposition <It is possible that none of the actual contingent 
beings existed> is true. 
(P4) The proposition’s truthmaker is the disposition of at least one 
necessary being. By (P1) and (P3). 
(P5) At least one necessary being exists. By (P2) and (P4). 
(P1) is clearly the most controversial thesis. Why think it is true on modal 
dispositionalism? To begin, the antecedent, (P3), is a “highly intuitive 
possibility.”82 This intuitive plausibility may be due to the fact that it certainly 
seems true that <if for every contingent entity x, x could fail to exist, then 
possibly all of the contingent beings fail to exist. That is, it seems very likely to 
be true. What of the consequent? According to MD*, a state-of-affairs S that is 
absent any of the actual contingent beings is possible iff either S, or if there is at 
least one disposition d, the manifestation of which is S. Dispositionalists are 
unlikely to posit that S does not admit of further metaphysical grounding, and 
so will look for the relevant disposition, d.83 Clearly, d could not belong to any of 
the non-existent contingent objects, as there are none (pace Meinongianism). 
Moreover, dispositions are possessed by and are ontologically dependent on 
                                                                                                                                                
He explicitly proposes the proposition found in (P1) as one resistant to dispositional 
truthmakers. Ross Cameron, “Truthmakers and Modality,” Synthese, 164, (2008). 
82 Ibid., 273. 
83 Further, most dispositionalists are truthmaker maximalists, whereby all truths require a 
truthmaker, so the true proposition needs a truthmaker in order to be so. 
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their individual bearers; they are not ontologically independent entities. 
Disposition d, then, must be had by at least one necessary being. The consequent 
appears to be true and so the conditional (P1) as well.  
It might be objected that negative existentials do not require truthmakers, 
and so while (P1)’s antecedent is true, its consequent is false, thereby yielding 
(P1) false. It is not clear, however, that the modal dispositionalists can avail 
herself of such a response. This is because the modal dispositionalist is already 
committed to truthmakers for at least some negative existentials. Recall from 
section 3.3.2 that dispositions entail counterfactual conditionals, and so are 
truthmakers for these conditionals. For example, <This vase would break were it 
struck> is entailed by the disposition, fragility, possessed by the glass. But <This 
vase would break were it struck> entails that <there is no mischievous sorcerer 
who would prevent the vase from breaking were it struck>.84 This latter 
proposition is a negative existential, and is ultimately entailed by the existence 
of fragility. Fragility is its truthmaker.85 The modal dispositionalist, then, needs 
to provide a principled reason to deny that the negative existential <It is possible 
that none of the actual contingent beings existed> has a truthmaker. Perhaps this 
can be done.       
That (P2) is true is uncontroversial. (P4) and (P5) follow logically from 
preceding premises. But is this argument likely to persuade the modal 
dispositionalist that she is committed to the existence of at least one necessary 
                                                 
84 The sorcerer example is from David Lewis, “Finkish dispositions,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 
no. 4 (1997) and it is discussed relative to truthmaker theory in Trenton Merricks, Truth and 
Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),  41-43, 159-160. 
85 For more extensive discussion of truthmakers for subjunctive conditionals, see Trenton 
Merricks, Truth and Ontology, (2007), 158-166. 
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being? Contessa (2010) would likely think not. 86 He rightly points out that it is 
open to the dispositionalist to accept (P1) as true by denying the veracity of (P3), 
thereby making the material conditional true. He admits that (P3) would likely 
be true if (P5) were true, but further argues that the truth of (P3) cannot be 
established independently of (P5). If this is so, then the argument is massively 
question begging. To the objection that (P3) is conceivable and so at least 
possible, he claims that conceivability is not a reliable guide to metaphysical 
possibility, and that the dispositionalist has a better means to determine that 
which is possible, namely a theory of modal truthmakers. So long as the 
dispositionalist is willing to deny the truth of (P3), her dispositionalism will not 
commit her to the existence of at least one necessary being by this argument. 
 A full response to Contessa’s suggestions would extend beyond the scope 
of this thesis. For now, I simply note that the joint denial of both (P3) and (P5) 
seems highly implausible. For if it is false that <It is possible that none of the 
actual contingent beings existed>, then it follows that <Necessarily, there are 
contingent beings>. This latter proposition has bizarre consequences, as noted 
by Alexander Pruss. 87 Moreover, it is not at all clear how the truth of this 
proposition could be ontologically grounded by any contingent beings. It 
appears that it must be taken as brute by the one who also denies (P5). Finally, in 
direct support of (P3), the following conditional certainly seems true, <If for 
every contingent being x, x could have failed to exist, then all of the contingent 
                                                 
86 Contessa, “Modal Truthmakers . . .,” (2010), of course, does not respond to an instance of the 
specific argument I give above. Rather, he defends dispositionalism against Cameron, 
“Truthmakers and Modality,” (2008)’s objections. 
87 For a discussion of some of the bizarre consequences that make this denial implausible, see 
Alexander Pruss, Actuality, Possibility, and Worlds, (New York: The Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2011):  217-218. 
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beings could have failed to exist.> The antecedent of this conditional is surely 
true, given that to be a contingent being just is to be such that one could fail to 
exist.   
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 In this work, I have delineated the contours of modal dispositionalism, 
demonstrating how it is a realist, actualist, non-reductive account of modality 
that grounds the truth of possibilities in irreducibly modal entities. I have 
further argued for its philosophic heritage in the thought of Aristotle, an 
ancestry that it shares with other theories of modality that are of the powers 
theory genus. Additionally, I have argued that the basic formulation of modal 
dispositionalism, MD, is committed to the existence of either an actual infinity of 
contingent beings or to at least one necessary being (MHC). In the process of so 
arguing, I have also suggested reformulations of MD that avoid direct 
commitment to the first disjunct of MHC, and that validate two necessary 
axioms for S5. Through this work, I recommend modal dispositionalism to the 
reader for serious consideration.     
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